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1Formal Aspects of Virtual Organisations
Forward
Collected here are abstracts and short papers presented at the Formal Aspects of
Virtual Organisations workshop (FAVO 2008), held in conjunction with FM’08.
Advances in network technology, software and services are making it ever
easier for organisations and individuals to form loosely-coupled Virtual Organ-
isations (VOs) around a common goal, often in order to take advantage of a
business opportunity or respond to an acute crisis. VOs arise in commercial,
governmental, political and military environments and may have been carefully
designed or may simply be ad hoc assemblies integrating diverse systems that
only rarely have been designed for collaboration. VO members may have differ-
ing trust and security policies. They may evolve dynamically as the environment,
membership and resource availability change.
Although VOs are a common business model, a mature formal understanding
of them has yet to develop. Integration of diverse members and policies, manage-
ment of evolution and an understanding of emergent behaviour all contribute to
a substantial challenge for designers of VOs and their members. The FAVO work-
shop aimed to bring together researchers and practitioners to share challenges
and potential solutions in this new application area for formal methods.
Our invited speaker, Tom McCutcheon, began the day by describing the view
taken by the UK government towards Virtual Organisations. While taking a VO-
style approach to many problems, they have pressing open questions around the
creation of VOs, providing trust in the resulting structures, and in maintaining
the provenance of responsibility and accountability for decisions made.
Subsequent talks focussed on: a proposal for development of a verifiable vir-
tual organisation as a challenge problem to bring together the formal methods,
virtual organisations and dependability communities; a description of policy re-
finement in VOs; Collaborative Networks in the public sector; using goal oriented
requirements engineering to define VO security objectives; and analysis of trust
behaviour to assess risk in VOs.
http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/events/FAVO2008/
Chairs Jeremy Bryans and John Fitzgerald, Newcastle University, UK
Programme Committee Alvaro Arenas, STFC Rutherford Appleton Labo-
ratory, UK; Luis Camarinha-Matos, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal;
Wojciech Cellary, Poznan University of Economics, Poland; Theo Dimitrakos,
British Telecom, UK; Simon Foley, University College, Cork, Ireland; Tomasz
Janowski, UNU-IIST Center for Electronic Governance, Macau SAR, China;
Fabio Martinelli, IIT-CNR, Italy; Giovanna di Marzo Serugendo, Birkbeck Col-
lege, London, UK; Philippe Massonet, CETIC, Belgium; TomMcCutcheon, Dstl,
UK.
The Verifiable Virtual Organisation:
A Position Paper
Jeremy W. Bryans and John S. Fitzgerald
School of Computing Science
Newcastle University, NE1 7RU, UK
{Jeremy.Bryans, John.Fitzgerald}@newcastle.ac.uk
Abstract. We propose the development of a verifiable virtual organ-
isation as a challenge problem for the research communities in formal
methods, virtual organisations and dependability. Our aims are to bench-
mark current technology and develop a roadmap for research towards the
verifiable VO. Addressing such a problem, initially in a constrained ap-
plication domain, could lead to advances in design technology for virtual
organisations.
1 Introduction
Verification is important to the design of successful VOs. In non-critical VOs it
is valuable to have confidence that, when called upon, the VO can cope with the
demands made on it. In critical applications, the survivability of the VO in the
face of internal and external threats, accidental and malicious, depends on the
ability confidently to predict its degraded modes of operation.
We propose the development of a verifiable virtual organisation as a challenge
problem for the research communities in formal methods, virtual organisations
and dependability. We use the term “verifiable virtual organisation” to describe
a VO whose properties are predictable by design. Our aims are to benchmark
current technology and develop a roadmap for research towards the verifiable
VO. Addressing such a problem, initially in a constrained application domain,
could lead to advances in design technology for virtual organisations including
underlying theory, patterns, methods and tools as well as developing the po-
tential for building dynamically reconfigurable systems that provably respect
resilience properties.
Multidisciplinary approaches are needed to develop effective VOs, so work on
verifiable VOs should involve formalists, VO specialists from, for example, busi-
ness information systems, and specialists in security, dependability and human
factors. In this position paper, we briefly describe our background in modelling
virtual organisation structures and policies (Section 2). We consider the role
of challenge problems within the computing science community, and suggest a
possible challenge problem related to verification in VOs (Section 3). We begin
to identify possible specific research challenges associated with several enabling
technologies (Section 4). We invite the formal methods community to identify,
define and attack challenge problems in this increasingly significant area.
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2 Our Experience
Our motivation to examine the problem of virtual organisations comes from work
with chemical engineers in the GOLD project1 aimed at developing middleware
to support through-life-cycle of VOs designed for the development, analysis and
manufacture of novel chemicals. At the same time, as part of the Interdisciplinary
Research Collaboration on Dependability of Computer-based Systems2, we were
encouraged by the UK Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) to
examine the space of virtual organisations, their possible structures and policies
for their governance.
Faced with the wide range of systems that qualify as virtual organisations
we mapped out a space of VO architectures on the basis of “dimensions” in-
cluding membership, information representation, provenance, time and trust [4].
Each dimension represents a choice, e.g. of a particular membership policy, in-
formation representation etc. A particular VO might be described in terms of
the choices made in each dimension. We developed formal models in the Vienna
Development Method (VDM) specification language [10, 11] representing specific
architectural decisions within each dimension.
Σa-tr :: coals : Cid
m
−→ Aid -set
agents : Aid
m
−→ Agent
inv (coals, agents) △
S
rng coals ⊆ dom agents ∧S
{
S
rng ags.clearance | ags ∈ rng agents} ⊆ dom agents ∧
. . .
Agent :: info : Information-set
clearance : Information
m
−→ Aid -set
inv (info, clearance) △ ∀i ∈ dom clearance · i ∈ info
InfoTransfer (from, to:Aid , is: Information-set, c:Cid)
ext rd coals : Cid
m
−→ Aid -set
wr agents : Aid
m
−→ Agent
pre {from, to} ⊆ dom agents ∧
c ∈ dom coals ∧ {from, to} ⊆ coals(c) ∧
is ⊆ agents(from)
post agents =
↼−−−−
agents † {to 7→
↼−−−−
agents(to) ∪ is}
Fig. 1. Extract from a model from [4]
Figure 1 shows an extract from one of the VO models. It is taken from [4],
where VOs are referred to as “dynamic coalitions”. The model is based on
1 http://www.goldproject.ac.uk
2 http://www.dirc.org.uk
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a system state of type Σa-tr in which coalitions (or VOs) are modelled as
sets of Agents. Information within the VO is distributed among the agents (of
type Agent) which each contain their own repository (info component) and
a clearance set of agents to which information may be transferred. Informa-
tion transfer is modelled by the operation InfoTransfer in which a precondition
records the assumption that the source and destination agents are members of
the common organisation and that the transfer is authorised to the destination
agent. The model is formal and can readily be implemented (the postcondition is
satisfied by an executable assignment). A directly executable form of the infor-
mation transfer model might run with precondition and postcondition checking
as run-time assertions.
The formal modelling approach was validated by showing how it could be
used to characterise the specific virtual organisation structure developed in
GOLD [5]. Developing and informally validating the GOLD model helped to
identify areas of incompleteness or ambiguity in that project’s provision. For ex-
ample, the GOLD VO did not provide complete handling of information reposi-
tories at VO dissolution, nor was it clear whether a VO could have an existence
independent of its members (when all the members had left, did the VO remain?)
The “Dimensions” work and its application in GOLD raised the possibility
of exploiting formal models as an aid in VO design. In subsequent work for Dstl,
a proof-of-concept workbench was developed for assessing the consequences of
design decisions relating to VOs, including human aspects, based on the use
of formal models [9]. Formal models of two specific VO structures were devel-
oped in VDM. The two models differed only in that they implemented different
policies for the dissemination of VO information to new members. The models
were directly executable and could be run on an efficient interpreter as part of
the tools that accompany the VDM modelling language [12]3. The application
programmer interface in the tool set permitted the development of an interface
that allowed a domain expert unfamiliar with the modelling notation to interact
with the models via the scenario script, comparing the consequences of alter-
native policy decisions. The use of the interface and model by domain experts
was observed and recorded before debrief by a psychologist, allowing us to draw
conclusions about the suitability of formal models for exploring, in an industrial
setting, the design of policies governing VOs.
Our work so far has been grounded in traditional formal methods, although
our experience in dependability research has led us to recognise that the achieve-
ment of a verifiable VO requires a much more interdisciplinary approach, and
our collaboration with a psychologist in this work has been a recognition of this.
3 The Role of Challenge Problems
The UK Computing Research Committee has sought to stimulate and focus the
research community’s work by proposing a series of “Grand Challenges”4 which
3 Available from http://www.vdmtools.jp/en/.
4 http://www.ukcrc.org.uk/grand challenges/index.cfm
4 Jeremy W. Bryans and John S. Fitzgerald
help the community to set its own agenda and address targets that stretch or
exceed current capabilities. Addressing such problems helps the community to
acquire knowledge of state of the art, benchmark current technology and drive
technology forward.
Among the Grand Challenges, the Dependable Systems Evolution (GC6)
challenge includes the development of a Verified Software Repository (VSR) [3].
To encourage contributions to the VSR, “mini challenges” have been proposed.
Joshi and Holzmann [14] identify the following characteristics of an ideal mini
challenge: “(a) it would be of sufficient complexity that traditional methods such
as testing and code reviews are inadequate to establish its correctness, (b) it
would be of sufficient simplicity that specification, design and verification could
be completed by a dedicated team in a relatively short time, say 2-3 years, and
(c) it would be of sufficient importance that successful completion of the mini
challenge would have an impact beyond the verification community.” The VSR
mini challenges that have emerged so far (notably Mondex, the verifiable file store
and the Pacemaker5) have been readily explicable problems, of demonstrable
relevance to the wider engineering community and have been either competitive
or cooperative in character.
Our objective is the development of verifiable VOs. What would a challenge
problem look like in this area? One option is to “take a VO and verify it”.
Because many VOs have limited lifespans, it would seem that a more useful
long-term goal is to develop the technology needed to make individual VOs that
can be verified. Contemporary formal approaches to verification are challenged
by the heterogeneity, openness and dynamic character of VOs, and by the lack
of centralised control over the behaviour of members. The challenge problem
proposed below will therefore require new research to solve.
Verifiable Infrastructure for Crisis Management
As an long-term goal, we propose the development of middleware to support
collaborative activities by civil, military and non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) in response to crises such as natural disasters. The middleware
would be intended to work with the information systems of the coalition par-
ticipants, supporting the gathering and dissemination of information. New
arrivals into the coalition would need to be “patched in”. Critical to the
success of crisis relief operations is the reliability of information on which
strategic decisions are made, e.g. where to send resources or set up distribu-
tion points. In hostile physical environments, it infrastructure must provide
a predictable flow of information, albeit degraded, even when some sources
fail. This infrastructure and the VOs built on it should be verifiable.
The mini challenges in the GC6 sphere propose verifying a existing system or
developing a relatively well-understood one. The infrastructure described above
5 Also called “pilot projects”: see http://vsr.sourceforge.net/X.htm where X = one
of mondex, flash or pacemaker.
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does not exist. Its development would likely spawn mini challenges in Joshi and
Holzmann’s terms, but its production is arguably a longer-term goal.
4 The Verifiable VO: Challenges
A VO is a complex system, displaying emergent behaviour. Consequently, small
changes in its design and operation can have large and unexpected consequences.
We need to be able to model and predict the effects of such changes on the mission
and outcome of the VO and dynamically assess and respond to these changes.
The technologies that underpin the process of building any verifiable system
include the theoretical foundations and abstractions of the basic elements of the
system in terms of these foundations, patterns embodying such things as good
design practice and resilience mechanisms, and application-level properties that
we wish to verify. Building such systems also requires mature tool support.
In the following sections we discuss each of these technologies in relation to
the specific problem of producing a verifiable VO.
4.1 Application-level Properties
At the application level, we wish to verify that the VO is “fit for purpose”. The
verification task will therefore require a description of the desired properties of
the VO and a specification of the VO itself.
Basic properties, such as lack of deadlock, livelock, reachability and timeliness
properties will have a role in the design of the infrastructure. At the operational
level, a VO will have many agent-level and organisation-level policies to do with
trust, risk, information security. These policies may limit the interaction within
the VO (for example, government organisations may not communicate directly
with NGOs for fear of compromising the independence of the latter). We should
be able to verify that these policies are sufficiently consistent to allow the VO
to function.
In many applications, the ability to analyse end-to-end properties such as in-
formation flow, security and privacy is particularly significant. There is a point
at which the participating agencies move from acting largely independently to
accepting direction from the coalition centre. The management of this handover
can be critical in high-tempo operations. In particular, we wish to avoid situ-
ations where actors “on the ground” have to resolve potentially contradictory
instructions from different centres.
Developers currently lack the means to elicit appropriate properties. We may
envisage techniques based on inductive and deductive reasoning (cf. fault tree
and failure mode and effects analysis) that will help to identify key verification
properties as well as drive out environmental assumptions. The description of
these properties will have greater validity as they are drawn from domain experts,
who may be unfamiliar with the specialist notation in which they are described.
The challenge here is to confirm that our description of a property (which must
necessarily be formal in order to validate it) conforms to the property that the
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domain experts themselves are seeking to ensure. Bridging the gap between the
mental model of the domain experts and the formal model of the verification
team will require an multidisciplinary approach.
The VO specification will include a necessarily implicit description of par-
ticipant behaviour and a model of the infrastructure (software and hardware)
components and their interaction. The specification of the purpose of the VO
will require a functional specification of either the goals to be achieved or a more
constructive description, such as a workflow. Implicit descriptions may suit the
analysis of emergent behaviour better.
In a workflow-based approach, we must draw a distinction between the de-
sign of the workflow itself and the feasibility of its implementation on a specific
platform (the VO itself, composed of the agents and their own policies). A par-
ticular verification challenge in VOs is coping with the possibility of dynamic
change in the VO infrastructure executing the workflow.
What does it mean for a workflow to be “feasible”? In a commercial envi-
ronment, metrics of the assessment of workflow might include cost. However,
in other situations, such as an emergency response scenario, we would want to
judge the workflow against other properties such as openness, flexibility etc. The
formal expression of such quality of service and non-functional properties is thus
a very relevant challenge. For example, Franco et al. [13] describe the support of
workflow-based collaboration in unpredictable mobile ad-hoc network environ-
ments within constrained (e.g. emergency response) scenarios.
The initial workflow design requires a semantics of the workflow language
and seems to be like a standard verification problem. Many of the challenges
seem to us to lie in the second part: the gaining of confidence that a proposed
workflow is feasible on a distributed and dynamic architecture. With a traditional
verification problem on a fixed platform, all properties are verifiable at design-
time. With a VO, much of this gaining of confidence must be pushed into the run-
time system. This is because many of the assumptions on which the verification
relies are much more likely to be broken. For example, if a workflow relies on the
capability of a particular agent, and that agent drops out of the VO, then the
workflow cannot be completed unless another agent with an equivalent capability
is recruited.
For a dynamic virtual organisation, resilience is a key property. By “re-
silience” we mean the ability to offer a specified level of service in the presence of
specified errors. An error is, in the sense of Avizienis et al. [2], a state that is out
of specification. A resilient system may offer a degraded level of service in the
presence of errors, or it may offer a service with reduced reliability. Challenges in
building resilient systems, whether VOs or not, lie in the ability to identify and
classify errors and to design a defence against them. A key part of our notion
of resilience is that the degraded level of service or reduced reliability should be
specified. It should be possible to make, at design time, some assertions about
VO behaviour in the presence of errors.
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At the initiation of a VO we will wish to be able to verify certain feasibility
criteria (e.g. are resources sufficient to accomplish the proposed workflow,
and is the access control policy the least privilege solution?)
During operation we will require guarantees on (at least) safety and security,
information flow and leakage. Providing a guaranteed audit capability is
often important. A crisis management VO must be able to evolve in ways
unpredictable at its inception, either because the task faced has evolved (e.g.
a second disaster has occurred) or because the VO has changed internally
(e.g. a member has left, or another member has joined.) Demonstrating
that properties are preserved during such a change will prove a significant
challenge. Mode change provides a further challenge. Invariant properties
must be shown to hold throughout the reconfiguration, which may last some
time and go through inconsistent states.
At the dissolution of the VO we may wish to ensure the preservation of
certain designated information, for example the audit trail.
4.2 Patterns and Methods
We work on the assumption that VOs can be supported by good engineering. The
practical utility of a calculus for modelling and reasoning about aspects of VOs
is improved by the development of patterns that describe frequently arising and
well-understood structures, and by the development of methods for VO design
and construction.
Patterns may be associated with information flow. For example, in man-
agement science taxonomies such as that of Lethbridge [15], in which VOs are
categorised according to the information flow between members and customers.
A virtual face organisation presents a single front to a customer; in a co-alliance
members may deal directly with the customer; in a star alliance subordinate
members each talk only to a lead partner; and in a value-alliance members are
organised in a ring.
There are many patterns that have been designed to achieve a degree of
resilience. Typically, they allow verification to take place in the face of increased
uncertainty about the internal and external errors faced by a system. A well-
known example is triple modular redundancy (TMR), where the behaviour of
a system relying on the availability and accuracy of a single component can
be improved by using three components and voting on the result. In VOs, the
achievement of resilience involves identifying and responding to a wide range of
errors arising from the distributed character of the system (e.g. network-based
impairment), the heterogeneity of components (e.g. semantic mismatches) and
the lack of common ownership (e.g. policy conflicts).
Because of the dynamic character of VO infrastructure, a single resilience
mechanism may not always be appropriate. It may be more appropriate to pro-
vide a resilience policy, which dynamically reconfigures the resilience mecha-
nisms at run-time to respond to events within the VO or its environment. These
events will be detected as changes in external metadata. Such metadata may be
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something as simple as a clock or a moding flag indicating a level of alert, for
example.
It would be valuable, though challenging, to allow developers to describe
dynamic policies that describe mode changes that are to occur in response to
specified events. Such policies are likely to be application-specific but languages
and tools for designing them may be more generic. There are some important
and interesting parallels with policy languages for describing run-time reconfigu-
rations in computer architectures. For example, Certo et al [6] propose a layered
approach to the definition of strategies that may cause reconfiguration.
We expect that patterns will also emerge for many other VO components,
such as policies governing information flow, information storage and membership.
We may view methods as patterns for parts of the development process. In
a mature discipline methods will be supported by tools. For example, model
exploration tools will be valuable in circumstances where we can’t pin down the
property that we wish to verify at a sufficiently early stage. Simulation-based
testing is an appropriate technology here. We can develop batches of test suites
and scenarios, but we will need to mediate the model to domain experts.
In the development of the crisis management middleware, a library of pat-
terns is needed that is rich enough to describe the VO structures in early,
relatively uncoordinated, phases as well as the more disciplined later stages
in the VO’s life. Examples of patterns include VO structure and information
flow. Patterns of standardised policies will be valuable in supporting the
rapid negotiation of participant entry into the coalition.
There are many potential failure modes with respect to the system-level
liveness and security properties. Examples include failures of data sources
(which range from simple, readily detectable failures to more subtle Byzan-
tine failures) and failures of network infrastructure.
Error detection and recovery mechanisms can be incorporated into the VO
architecture. Ultimately, we may envisage dynamic reconfiguration in sup-
port of resilience, e.g. in altering the number of versions in an n-version
solution or altering the frequency of checkpointing in suspect transactions.
Such reconfiguration entails having an on-line reasoning capability.
Methods and tools that would be valuable include tools to guide the architect
in evaluating the consequences of selecting different design alternatives and
to support effects-based analysis. Once developed, a good model would be
predictive as well as descriptive and therefore have value as an exploratory
and training tool.
4.3 Foundations
There are many highly specialized families of foundational theories that might
be used to describe VOs, each with associated specification languages, semantics
and methods. These include temporal logics [7], epistemic logics [8], state-based
modelling (VDM [10], the B-method [1]), process-based modelling (CSP, CCS),
as well as many others.
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No one method is currently adequate as a complete foundation for under-
standing VOs. It may be necessary to employ diverse formalisms in order to
gain an understanding of a VO from multiple viewpoints. The challenge is to
use these formalisms in a consistent manner.
Abstractions are built on top of a foundational theory. They are descriptions
of basic VO components in terms of that theory. They may be atomic method
elements or concepts (for example communication in a VO could be described as
a synchronisation event in a process algebra) or they may be more complex (for
example an access control policy could be an implicit function in a state-based
language).
A necessary task for any foundational theory we choose is to develop a suit-
able set of abstractions. These will provide the basis of our vocabulary for talk-
ing about VOs within that theory. In many cases the theory itself will suggest
appropriate basic abstractions, but the more complex abstractions must be care-
fully developed and validated. In [4, 5] the authors used VDM-SL to propose a
framework for placing abstractions, and began the process of developing a set of
abstractions for virtual organisations.
A challenge here is to show how abstractions in different theories can be linked
in a consistent manner to compliment each other so that (for example) for a
single agent its communication behaviour can be described in a communication-
based language, its state of knowledge in an epistemic logic, and its stochastic
behaviour in an stochastic language.
5 Conclusions
We have argued that the development of a verifiable virtual organisation is a
realistic and worthwhile research challenge. Theoretical foundations are largely
already laid, but the provision of abstractions, patterns, methods, and tools
present significant challenges. At the application level, the specification of the key
properties of virtual organisations is a relatively unexplored area. This suggests
that a series of mini challenges addressing these areas could provide shorter-term
goals. These mini challenges (steps on the road to a verifiable VO) are likely to
generate contributions to the VSR.
The goal of a verifiable VO is in the spirit of the Dependable Systems Evo-
lution Grand Challenge. Arguably, it concerns system modelling and design as
much as software verification, since VOs incorporate components over which the
VO developer has no control. It is the heterogeneity and dynamic behaviour of
these components that give rise to many of the research challenges.
Considering this proposal in the light of the characteristics put forward by
Joshi and Holzmann, the task outlined is certainly of sufficient complexity that
current methods of validation would be insufficient. It is unclear to us whether
anything more than a subset of the task could be completed in 3 years, but the
creation of such an infrastructure would without doubt have an impact beyond
the verification community.
10 Jeremy W. Bryans and John S. Fitzgerald
Acknowledgments: This work has been supported by the EPSRC project
on User-friendly Grid Security, the EU FP7 Deploy project and by the UK
EPSRC Platform Project on Trustworthy Ambient Systems. We are indebted
to many colleagues at Newcastle and in Dstl, in particular Tom McCutcheon,
Helen Phillips, Olwen Worthington and John Yesberg.
References
1. J.-R. Abrial. The B-Book: Assigning programs to meanings. Cambridge
University Press, 1996.
2. A. Avizienis, J.-C. Laprie, B. Randell, and C. Landwehr. Basic Concepts and
Taxonomy of Dependable and Secure Computing. IEEE Transactions on
Dependable and Secure Computing, 1(1):11–33, 2004.
3. J. C. Bicarregui, C. A. R. Hoare, and J. C. P. Woodcock. The verified software
repository: a step towards the verifying compiler. Formal Aspects of Computing,
18(2):143–151, 2006.
4. J. W. Bryans, J. S. Fitzgerald, C. B. Jones, and I. Mozolevsky. Dimensions of
Dynamic Coalitions. Technical Report CS-TR-963, Newcastle University, School
of Computing Science, May 2006.
5. J. W. Bryans, J. S. Fitzgerald, C. B. Jones, and I. Mozolevsky. Formal Modelling
of Dynamic Coalitions, with an Application in Chemical Engineering. In
T. Margaria, A. Philippou, and B. Steffen, editors, Proc. 2nd Intl. Symp. on
Leveraging Applications of Formal Methods, Verification and Validation. IEEE,
2007. See Tech. Report 981, School of Computing Science, Newcastle University.
6. J. Certo, N. Lau, and L. P. Reis. A Generic Strategic Layer for Collaborative
Networks. In L. Camarinha-Matos, H. Afsarmanesh, P. Novais, and C.Analide,
editors, Establishing the Foundation of Collaborative Networks, pages 273–282.
Springer, September 2007.
7. E. A. Emerson. Temporal and model logic, chapter 16. The MIT Press, 1990.
8. R. Fagin, J. Y. Halpern, Y. Moses, and M. Y. Vardi. Reasoning about knowledge.
MIT press, 1995.
9. J. S. Fitzgerald, J. W. Bryans, D. Greathead, C. B. Jones, and R. Payne.
Animation-based Validation of a Formal Model of Dynamic Virtual
Organisations. In P. Boca and J. P. Bowen, editors, Proc. BCS-FACS Workshop
on Formal Methods in Industry. British Computer Society, 2008. In press.
10. J. S. Fitzgerald and P. G. Larsen. Modelling Systems – Practical Tools and
Techniques in Software Development. Cambridge University Press, 1998.
11. J. S. Fitzgerald, P. G. Larsen, P. Mukherjee, N. Plat, and M. Verhoef. Validated
Designs for Object-oriented Systems. Springer Verlag, London, 2005. ISBN
1-85233-881-4.
12. J. S. Fitzgerald, P. G. Larsen, and S. Sahara. VDMTools: advances in support for
formal modeling in VDM. ACM SIGPLAN Notices, February 2008. To appear.
Also Technical Report CS-TR-1057, School of Computing Science, Newcastle
University.
13. R. D. Franco, A. Neyem, S. Ochoa, and R. Navarro. Supporting Mobile Virtual
Team’s Coordination with SOA-based Active Entities. In L. Camarinha-Matos,
H. Afsarmanesh, P. Novais, and C.Analide, editors, Establishing the Foundation
of Collaborative Networks, pages 557–564. Springer, September 2007.
14. Rajeev Joshi and Gerard J. Holzmann. A mini challenge: build a verifiable
filesystem. Formal Aspects of Computing, 19(2):269–272, 2007.
15. N. Lethbridge. An I-based taxonomy of Virtual Organisations and the
Implications for Effective Management. Informing Science, 4(1):17–24, 2001.
Policy Refinement in Virtual Organisations
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Abstract. Grid computing is a global-computing paradigm focusing on
the effective sharing and coordination of heterogeneous services and re-
sources in dynamic, multi-institutional virtual organisations (VOs). This
paper presents a formal model of Grid-based VOs using the Event-B spec-
ification language. We have followed a refinement approach to develop
goal-oriented VOs by incrementally adding their main elements: goals,
organisations and resources. Our main interest is in the problem of policy
refinement in VOs, so policies are represented as invariants that should
be maintained throughout the refinement process.
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Abstract. Collaborative Networks comprise a collection of distributed agents - 
individuals or organizations, engaged in computer-supported collaboration to 
achieve common goals. Public sector initiatives, in particular, require setting up 
and maintaining large collaborative networks which are susceptible to a variety 
of technical and organizational challenges. One of the reasons is the usage of 
different languages by collaborating agents to carry out communication and 
describe the resources they make available to one another. This gives rise to 
various challenges: (1) As different agents may understand the same 
communication term differently or use different terms to identify the same 
meaning, the terms may be interpreted incorrectly during interactions - 
Semantic Inconsistency; (2) The terms used to describe the needs of an agent 
and those describing available resources are expressed at different levels of 
abstraction - Semantic Gap; (3) The agents may use different languages to 
describe the resources they make available to other agents - Heterogeneity. In 
this paper, we propose a technical solution to address these challenges, called 
Semantic Interoperability Middleware (SIM). SIM assumes that the interacting 
agents agree upon a family of ontologies to express the meaning of the 
languages they use in communicating, with mappings to relate such ontologies. 
Based on this assumption, SIM offers three infrastructure services to address 
the above challenges: (a) Validation Service - detects Semantic Inconsistencies; 
(b) Mediation Service - resolves Semantic Inconsistencies, and (c) Discovery 
Service - addresses Semantic Gap and Heterogeneity challenges. In order to 
illustrate how SIM can be applied in the public sector, the paper presents three 
case studies in electronic delivery of social welfare benefits, one for each SIM 
service. Finally, the paper describes how formal techniques were applied in the 
development and operation of SIM, and explores further opportunities. 
Keywords: Collaborative Networks, Public Sector, Semantic Interoperability, 
Middleware. 
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Tool Support for Modelling and Analysing
Virtual Organisations Security Requirements
and Policies
Philippe Massonet
CETIC, Belgium
Abstract. Starting and operating a secure virtual organisation (VO)
requires that security objectives and requirements have been defined
and are enforced throughout the VO lifecycle. In this position paper
we describe how a goal oriented requirements engineering method has be
tailored for defining VO security objectives and refining them into en-
forceable security policies. Security objectives are expressed using tem-
poral logic and can be refinements can be verified via model checking.
Work is in progress to translate VO security requirements into enforce-
able security policies. The also paper presents work on an Eclipse based
policy design tool that allows specifying and refining security objectives
into requirements. Work is in progress to provide tool support for veri-
fying refinements using model checking technology, and to translate the
resulting security requirements into enforceable security policies.
Modeling and analysis of trust-dependent
behavior to assess risk in virtual organizations
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A virtual organization is a loosely coupled organization that is established
around a common goal, such as exploiting a business opportunity or respond
to an acute crisis. The lifetime of a virtual organization is typically shorter
than that of a conventional organization, and its members will usually form a
heterogeneous set of organizations or individuals that have little or no experience
with cooperating with each other. Therefore, in order to assess the risk (and
prospect) to which a virtual organization as a whole is exposed, it is essential
to understand how trust considerations influence the interaction between its
members. This requires that we take the perspective of the virtual organization
as a whole, rather than the perspective of a single member. Otherwise, the
objective understanding of the virtual organization that is needed to perform
the assessment cannot be obtained.
We propose a language and a method for modeling and analysis of trust and
trust-based behavior. The language allows us to capture the subjective trust
considerations and decisions made by the different actors within a system or or-
ganization, as well as their resulting behavior and interaction. This means that
the language is eminently suited for analyzing the risks and prospects related
to trust-based behavior in virtual organizations. Furthermore, the modeling lan-
guage is based on sequence diagrams. This choice was made because trust is of
interest only when entities interact, and a major strength of sequence diagrams
is their ability to convey interaction scenarios in a simple and intuitive manner.
The method proceeds in three steps. In step 1, the target of analysis is mod-
eled. The model should include information about what decisions are taken on
the basis of trust, and what considerations lie behind such decisions.
Step 2 is the analysis step. Here we start by identifying critical decision
points, where actors make decisions (or could potentially make decisions) based
on trust. Next, we evaluate to what degree the trust on which actors make
decisions is well-founded. Obviously, decisions should not be based on ill-founded
trust. We then estimate what would be the impact of alternative behavior, such
as increasing the level of trust required by an actor in order to engage in a
particular interaction. As the final part of the analysis step, we evaluate and
compare the various alternative behaviors, in order to identify the behaviors
that should be sought or avoided.
Step 3 is the final step. Here we specify a policy with the aim to ensure that
the optimal choices of behavior are made.
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